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Abstract
Ransomware attacks are rare, yet catastrophic. On closer inspection, they dier from
other malware infections: Given appropriate preparation, they do not need to be detected
and prevented, but could be recovered later. However, current ransomware protection
follows the beaten path of anti-malware copying their fallacies. We show how the move to
personal cloud storage allows for a paradigm shift in ransomware protection: exceptional
attack isolation, perfect elimination of false positive alerts, and simplied recovery.
In this paper, we analyze the necessary operations for ransomware, extend existing
ransomware taxonomy, and verify them against real-world malware samples. We analyze
the costs and benets of moving ransomware detection to versioned personal cloud stor-
age. Our content, meta data, and behavior analysis paired with a `guilt by association'
capability greatly improve the false positive rate, but the guided undo make this rate all
but inconsequential. Even though the user now carries a new burden, it comes with clear
responsibilities and benets, while being freed from questionable duties, resulting in a
win-win situation for user experience and detection quality.
1 Introduction
Ransomware attacks are most eective when they can strike when no backups of the data
exist, and the victim notices the encryption of his personal data after modifying les just a few
hours ago. Tempting the victims to pay ransom in the hope of getting relief, and thus nancing
organized crime or losing all the personal data generating an economic loss for organizations and
companies. It is therefore imperative for users and society to reduce the impact of ransomware
to a rare event, causing no more than a brief annoyance. Current ransomware detection is
integrated with or modeled after other malware protection: The key to defense is software
running on the victim's machine, trying to identify malware when it is downloaded or rst
activated. Identifying the purpose of software from its bytestream is impossible [24], and once
the software is running, anti-malware is not more powerful or bug-free than the operating
system, whose duty includes protection from malicious software. This model cannot eliminate
the problems of malware circumventing the detection software, thus leading to limitations which
reduce the identication and recovery quality [23, 22].
Traditional ransomware detection analyzes program code and le operations, among other
indicators, to detect potential malware activity. Either of them can result in false positives,
triggering the user to react, often with panic. The anti-malware developer's goal therefore
is to minimize the number of false positives, resulting in false negatives. If malware goes
undetected, the data, even on the backup disk, when connected, may be encrypted or destroyed;
an essentially unsolvable dilemma.
A more suitable solution would be an undo operation to the state of the les before the at-
tack, with a backup strategy that cannot be circumvented. The ongoing move to personal cloud
storage, however, opens the possibility of a paradigm shift in ransomware detection. Having
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Figure 1: Possible victim machines
an up-to-date copy of all important data on an unrelated system where no ordinary user can
install or run additional software provides for exceptional attack isolation, perfect elimination
of false positive alerts, and simplied recovery. These benets from attack isolation come at
a cost: the weaker coupling to the events on the victim's machine reduces information about
ongoing le operations as part of the malware, such as the sequence of actual le operations,
and details including le osets.
The missing real-time information has some impact on content-based and metadata-based
indicators, which may analyze short-term (on the order of seconds) event sequences; however,
analyzing long-term behavior remains unaected. We shift the classication towards this indi-
cator, supported by the le versioning to observe le operations without data loss. This shift
improves the separation between processes of benign software which work with high entropy
les and ransomware attacks.
The independence gained by the weak coupling between victim machine and cloud storage
more than osets the analysis limitations, as the detection software and archived le versions
cannot be manipulated by the ransomware.
We propose the following data security model to protect against many incidents, including
ransomware attacks (Figure 1): The user's machine (left) does a traditional backup to a locally-
attached storage (far left). It also performs a real-time synchronization to a personal cloud
storage, such as provided by a personal machine of the Raspberry Pi class or a cloud provider.
Important is that the cloud storage be versioned, so that previous, unaected, states of the
data may be restored. As long as at most one of the two systems (user machine, personal
cloud) is infected, data can be recovered. In the unlikely event that the cloud storage is the one
being infected, synchronization of destroyed data may happen back to the user machine. This
is guaranteed not to aect the backup, as it is outside of the synchronization scope.
As a result, unlike most other security incidents, ransomware does not necessarily need to
be detected on rst sight. Relaxing the requirements by using a delayed detection and recovery
approach assisted by the personal cloud storage, allows us to remove the need of having a 100%
detection rate without any false positives, something infeasible with real-time detection.
Oering such a model should also bring a usability improvement for the user by simplifying
the recovery process by using the proposed indicators to analyse and classify the les and
oering an color guidance for the user with an easy-to-use one-click recovery.
This paper makes the following contributions:
1. We dene the general problems ghting ransomware using generic indicators.
2. We formulate a taxonomy of requirements for operation classes as well as indicator cate-
gories and verify it with real-world malware samples.
3. We dene a set of content-based, metadata-based and behavior-based indicators which are
a set of already suggested indicators and indicators extended or improved by us.
4. Based on these indicators, we implement a ransomware detection in an app on top of
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Nextcloud cloud storage, which assists making the right selection when recovering from
an attack.
2 Problems ghting ransomware
Ransomware attacks are rare events. However, is it necessary to analyze every le operation to
detect them. Once we use an automatic recovery, we need to have a detection rate without any
false positives since a { still so small { false positive rate would lead to many false recoveries
due to many le operations performed on a computer system [18, 1].
Perfect protection can be achieved with a system that will not lose any data during a
ransomware attack and will always recover the data that was destroyed by ransomware and not
removed by the user himself. Educating the user through an easy-to-use recovery, guiding the
user with informations gathered by analysing and classifying le operation sequences, will lead
to such a mechanism where the user is in control. Since ransomware attacks are so rare, it is
easier for the user to take a spare moment to recover if an attack happens instead of taking
many moments struggling with false positives.
This change can be compared with the usability step as in the 80s where the move from
le-based manual versioning to the simple undo method was established. This reduced the
eort for the user drastically. Furthermore, it opened up the le versioning for the group
of unsophisticated users by simplifying the recovery. This point is important in companies,
universities or organizations which oer a \bring your own device (BYOD)" integration, where
our usability concept can reduce the eort of the IT-support by allowing the users to perform
the recovery by themselves [5].
This approach should not just be seen as another step in the arms race between defenders
and attackers. Using backups on an autonom system is only existing solution which can be
merely circumvented with tremendous eort: Automated simultaneous attacks of two related
autonom systems with the goal to disable the backup system and encrypt the data. Extending
this solution with our easy-to-use recovery improves it drastically by educating the user and
allowing him to quickly restore all changes. Bypassing this recovery by exploiting the insight in
our metrics would lead to additional eort, we might assume that this is comparable with the
popular and well-known Nigerian scam. Where the attacker as Nigerian royalty asks for money
by sending a poorly worded email. Cormac Herley in his paperWhy do Nigerian Scammers Say
They are from Nigeria? showed that not only defenders have false positives also the attackers
suer from false positive. This is a result of the trade o between prot and investment based
on the eort performed. Cormac Herley stated that the typos in the emails are a method to
reduce the false positives on the attacker side by removing the users who would answer these
emails and still not pay the money from the pool of victims { generating unrewarded eort
for the attackers { on the rst sight leaving only the users who are naively enough to pay the
money with or without the typos [7]. Transferring this to our problem allows us to assume
that additional eort leads to a worse investment-prot-balance which does not result in an
improvement of the ransomware but a more specic targeting of users who do not protect them
self.
The generic real-time ransomware detection approaches proposed in dierent papers oer a
real-time detection together with an automatic recovery proclaiming a nearly perfect detection
rate with very few false positives [2, 3, 11, 9]. The rarity of a ransomware attack and automatic
recovery make theses good detection rates problematic: Assuming we have a ransomware de-
tection software, which monitors every of the 100,000 le operations a day on the le system
with a false positive rate of 0.1%. This would result in 100 falsely triggered recoveries leading
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to 100 unnecessary user interactions reverting these false recoveries. Additionally, the eorts
for reducing the false positives lead to a very concrete set of indicators allowing the ransomware
authors to build the malware against these indicators avoiding the detection [1].
For blocking decisions, we therefore should include every possible generic property. It is
unavoidable to integrate a le versioning mechanism to be able to consider more le operations.
This can also be done in real-time and with automatic recovery [3] but is limited by the base
rate fallacy.
This cannot be considered reliable due to ransomware circumventing local backup software
and detection software by disabling them or overwriting the Master Boot Record to perform
the encryption in a state of the pc where only the malware is running [23, 22].
3 Related work
Existing ransomware indicators were used in dierent attempts to detect malicious software,
while having several limitations like false positives in form of benign software, which fullled
the same indicators e.g. high entropy les created by compression tools [17] or bypassing the
monitoring by avoiding the indicators thresholds or hiding the malicious process [3, 8]. Long-
term observations of ransomware showed their proceeding and possible indicators to prevent
zero-day attacks of ransomware [10]. This already constructed a wide-spread set of indicators
for detecting ransomware. Possible improvements for the indicators were evaluated: Such as
the analysis of the entropy of les to improve it by being able to distinguish between encryption
and compression, which are both high entropy les, without leading to a satisfying result [4].
Additionally, the long-term observation Symantec published several reports with information
and statistics of ransomware over the last several years showing the spreading, behavior, attack
methods and how to prevent attacks [19, 21, 20, 16].
Also other researchers published in-depth analyses of ransomware oering informations to
many dierent families [15, 12].
Independent from such indicators, there are techniques like controlling the access to the
command-and-control servers to prevent the execution of the ransomware [2] and the detection
and escrowing of the encryption key to later decrypt the les without having to pay the money
[11].
These indicators were already used to build techniques for detecting and preventing ran-
somware in real-time [8, 9, 11, 17]. In addition, there is a concept based on sequences and a
backup strategy but it acts on the local system without the need of interaction of the user [3].
Limitations of this approach are mainly the bypassing of the monitor by tampering the Kernel
or multiprocess malware.
Additionally, the base rate fallacy is a huge problem due to the rarity of ransomware attacks
with just a few true positives and potentially many false positives due to plenty non-ransomware-
specic le operations leading to a burden for the user [18, 1].
Our work is unlike the real-time approaches and can be described as delayed detection and
recovery. It presents a method using a personal cloud storage by providing easy-to-use recovery
from ransomware attacks including taking the users into control of the recovery. The need for
such a concept was also indicated by a support page in the Dropbox help center [5]. They
tackle this problem by requesting the user to recover every single le by hand or sending a list
of encrypted les to the Dropbox support.
This approach is based on the personal cloud storage Nextcloud and utilizes the integrated
le versioning and trash bin methods [13, 14]. The integrated methods use additional logical
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le storages or directories to backup modied les with database links adding the necessary
informations of the le version.
4 Background: Classes
Ransomware activity is not a static set of operations, which is performed in the same way in
every ransomware family [10, 15, 12, 16]. The reasons for this are on one hand the race between
security researchers and ransomware programmers to detect and hide the activities by changing
the operations, and on the other hand the huge code base of existing ransomware to copy from.
This leads to several implementations and many dierent families. Based on our analysis of
ransomware operations, we also believe that some of the unusual, inecient behavior we have
seen is due to the high division of labor or just due to oversight or stupidity of the ransomware
developer.
The process of constructing an ecient and working way to detect ransomware includes
formulating classes for the dierent types of ransomware. These will then be used to dene
indicators.
The classes in this section are based on the behavior of existing ransomware families and
possible { not yet existing { implementations. For a better overview, the ransomware classes
are separated into the following subclasses: File destruction, operation sequence, le
type funnelling and Entropy funnelling. In addition, the operation sequence classes are
described for the local le system and the cloud storage.
A ransomware belongs to each of these subclasses and fulls only one of the properties of
the according subclass.
4.1 File destruction
The main behavior is the encryption of user les, therefore the ransomware must read the data,
write the data and remove the original data afterwards.
This behavior is implemented in various ways by dierent ransomware variants. The diverse
implementations can be classied in two classes:
Class A Replaces the data of a le in-place, thus it rst reads the data from the le then
encrypts it, writes the encrypted data back to the le, and closes it. Afterwards, the le
is optionally renamed.
Class B Creates a new le and moves the data to the new le by reading the content from
the original le, encrypting it and writing the encrypted data to the new le, deleting the
original le after closing the les.
Existing literature classies ransomware in three classes, where Class A and Class B remain
the same [17]. They additionally introduced a class, which is an extension of Class A, moves
the les in an extra folder before encrypting the les in-place and then moving them back. We
treat this class as a subclass of Class A, because the main indicator for this class is the in-place
encryption and the movement of the les is an unnecessary extension, which does not change
the fundamental characteristics.
4.2 Operation sequence
The le destruction can be performed in dierent operation sequences where every sequence is
unlike the others due to the order of operations. The ordering can change with every system
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hence we divide the operation sequence classes into two dierent scenarios: The operations
performed on a local le system and the operations performed during a synchronization process
with a cloud storage.
The dierentiation between those two scenarios have the simple reason, that the synchro-
nization is performed by a client software, which reorders the le operations that happen during
a synchronization interval leading to dierent operation orders.
Thus the classes for the local le system are dened as following:
Batch: Batch WRITE followed by batch DELETE/RENAME-with-overwrite.
Interleaved: Interleaved WRITE { DELETE/RENAME-with-overwrite.
In-place-overwrite: In-place-overwrite
The classes for the le operations visible during the synchronization are dened like this:
Batch: Batch WRITE followed by batch DELETE/RENAME.
Inversed batch: Batch DELETE/RENAME followed by batch WRITE.
Interleaved: Interleaved WRITE { DELETE/RENAME.
Chaos: Chaos WRITE { DELETE/RENAME.
Class Inversed batch represents a regroup of class Batch and class Chaos depicts a
regroup and arbitrary split of class Interleaved. As mentioned in the previous section the
operations can be preceded by rst moving the les to a special directory.
4.3 File type funnelling
Other options include whether the le extensions of encrypted les are random strings, a
ransomware-specic extension, or the le type is unchanged from the original le. Similar
things may also happen to the le name [6].
File type funnelling describes the process of reading many les with known le extensions
and writing les, which can be assigned to the following classes:
1. All le extensions are unknown and the same.
2. All le extensions are unknown and every extension is distinct.
3. All le extensions are unknown and mixed.
4. All le extensions are known, but les are corrupted.
We dene "known" in this enumeration as: File extensions which are known well or le exten-
sions with well-known le types. Additionally, class 3 and 4 are possible but so far non-existing
implementations of le type funnelling.
4.4 Entropy funnelling
All ransomware families encrypt the data of the user les to extort the user. Hence the entropy
of the les is increased { except if all the original les were compressed or also encrypted { thus
all current ransomware families show the property of entropy funnelling, where the entropy
level of all les is changed to become nearly the same.
In theory, there are options to reduce the entropy of the les written or have them stay
nearly the same. Such malware has not been described nor seen in the wild.
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5 Background: Indicators
The discussed indicators in this section capture the destructive properties of ransomware re-
garding a single le or a sequence of les and not modications of the operation system. The
described indicators were chosen to be general enough to work for all ransomware variants and
try to ignore specic identiers like specic strings or network trac to the command-and-
control server.
We divide these into three groups of content-based, metadata-based and behavior-based prop-
erties, where the content-based indicators capture the properties of the data, metadata-based
indicators express the properties of the le and the behavior-based ones describe the properties
of the sequence. They are described in more detail in [6].
Most of these indicators are well discussed in [8, 17, 3]. They also showed that the single
indicator is not able to determine between benign software and ransomware, but several of those
indicators together are able to do so.
The goal of the following chapter is to improve the signicance of the Shannon Entropy and
to append yet not discussed indicators, which are described in operation timing and operation
quantities together with size quantities.
5.1 Content-based
5.1.1 Shannon entropy
The Shannon entropy is a measurement of information in a le. Files with a high entropy
are compressed and encrypted les, where the information level is reduced to gain a specic
property of compression or encryption. Thus a ransomware attack should change the entropy
of les to a higher average due to the encryption of les.
The denition of the Shannon entropy for a byte array of 256 bytes is as follows:
e =
255X
i=0
PBi log2
1
PBi
for PBi =
Fi
totalbytes and Fi, the number of instances of byte value i in the array. This sum
expresses a value between 0 and 8, where 8 is the perfectly even distribution of the byte values
in the array [17].
This is an indicator for malware les, as mentioned encrypted les have a nearly 8 distribu-
tion. Compression also tends to a nearly 8 distribution. Therefore, we analysed high entropy
les with the goal to nd a method to distinguish between encrypted and compressed les.
5.1.2 Improved Shannon entropy
To reduce the false positives of compressed les we use the standard deviation of the entropy of
the data to distinguish between compressed and encrypted les. This method is based on the
dierences in the variance of high entropy blocks in the le data which are depicted in the box
plots 3 an 2 of le encrypted with AES and les compressed with Deate. The box plots are
asymptotic because with larger data blocks the entropy of the blocks approaches the expected
value and therefore reduces the standard deviation and larger blocks compensate areas with
low entropy better than smaller blocks.
We use the property that the entropy of data blocks of encrypted les are very dense
distributed, where in contrast the entropy of data blocks of compressed les is not very dense
distributed.
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Figure 2: Boxplot of the standard
deviation of les compressed with
Deate.
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Figure 3: Boxplot of the standard
deviation of les encrypted with
AES.
This property is depicted by the standard deviation if we cut the data of the le in 256 bytes
blocks and calculate the entropy of every block and the standard deviation of the entropy. The
comparison of the standard deviation can be examined in gure 4. We choose a threshold of
0.06 for a data block size of 256 bytes for dierentiating between encrypted and compressed
les. The classication of this method does have a false positive rate of 10% but improves the
indicator of the entropy of the data a lot due to the usage of a guilt by association presumption.
The false positive rate results from compression algorithms that have a very dense distri-
bution with less outliers e.g. LZMA (see gure 5). In contradiction, all evaluated encryption
algorithms generated a dense distribution hence we have less false negatives. Files classied
as encrypted are more suspicious then other high entropy les thus we increase the suspicious
classication of the le.
This means we have only a few false negatives and some false positives: If we classify a
sequence we can use the `guilt by association' conclusion to assure our suspected case.
6 Application implementation
The ransomware detection implementation is based on the personal cloud storage Nextcloud.
The reason for this storage are the good le versioning and trash bin methods, which are
integrated into this cloud storage and are used here to recover from a detected ransomware
attack.
The functionality and limitations of the underlying le versioning and trash bin methods of
Nextcloud will be described in the limitations.
To describe the integration into the NextCloud server, we describe the monitoring of le
operations in the rst subsection, followed by the integration of the sequence analysis. The last
subsection describes the recovery method which uses the integrated le versioning and trash
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Figure 6: Architecture and integration of the ransomware detection application,
which separates the concerns of monitoring, classifying and recovering les and
le sequences.
bin of Nextcloud.
6.1 Monitoring
To monitor all le operations, the data storage of Nextcloud is wrapped, piping all le operations
through our analyser, gaining the needed operations by analysing the operations with indicators
dened in section 5.
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Figure 7: Colouring of a sequence
of le operations created by the
ransomware GoldenEye.
Figure 8: Colouring of a sequence
of le operations created by the le
encryption tool AxCrypt.
6.2 Sequence analysis
The sequence analysis puts le operations together to a sequence by looking for time intervals
where nothing happens. In the context of Nextcloud this is equivalent with synchronization
requests with no changes. Thus we are detecting all synchronization requests of a client without
le storage access and if there is a succession of six synchronization requests without changes, we
start a new sequence of le operations. The succession of six synchronization requests conforms
three minutes where no changes are synchronized. This time interval is relevant for ransomware
families (e.g. WannaCry) which work by batch writing all les and afterwards batch deleting
all les and would lose the correct classication if the sequence of le operations would be split.
During our evaluation,WannaCry delayed the le deletion by 10 to 90 seconds depending on the
host system, therefore we dened a reasonably long enough time interval which reects a break
of le operations. However, if this threshold fails the user, in the situation of a ransomware
attack, should nonetheless be able to nd the split sequence easily by looking for the les which
he knows were encrypted and recover both with an additional operation.
6.3 Classication
The results of the analysis performed during the monitoring are used to classify le operations
and sequences of them. These results are used in recovery interface to give the user a color guide,
which leads to the following depiction of le operation sequences (see gure 7, 8, 9 and 10).
6.4 Recovery
To recover from ransomware attacks the selected sequence of le operations will be reverted;
that means new created les will be deleted and deleted or renamed les will be restored. This
is done by using the integrated le versioning methods of Nextcloud.
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Figure 9: Colouring of a harmless
sequence of le operations created
by manual batch DELETE/RE-
NAME followed by batch WRITE.
Figure 10: Colouring of a harmless
sequence of le operations created
by writing many les.
Family File suspicion score Quantities File type funnelling Entropy funnelling Sequence suspicion score
BTCWare 0.88 2.00 2.00 2.00 6.88
Cerber 0.75 2.00 2.00 2.00 6.75
Evasive 0.83 2.00 2.00 2.00 6.83
Evader 0.50 2.00 2.00 2.00 6.50
GlobeImposter 0.63 2.00 2.00 2.00 6.63
WannaCry 0.81 2.00 2.00 2.00 6.81
Mamba 0.79 2.00 2.00 2.00 6.79
GoldenEye 0.93 2.00 2.00 2.00 6.93
Median 0.63 2.00 2.00 2.00 6.63
Table 1: A list of ransomware families and their behavior-based indicator values
with the sequence suspicion score.
7 Experiments
In this section the application is reviewed in dierent aspects to evaluate the functionality and
eectiveness. Therefore the classication of the sequences and the eectiveness of the indicators
are evaluated.
7.1 Classication
The sequence classication was tested with a dataset of multiple ransomware families which
were submitted to VirusTotal in the last months.
The table shows the weighted sum of the content-based and metadata-based indicators no-
tated as le suspicion score, followed by the behavior-based indicators. The sequence suspicion
score is the sum of all indicators and the le suspicion score, for more details see [6].
For every of those samples the classication reached a critical sequence suspicion score
leading to a highly suspicious sequence.
AxCrypt also reached a higher suspicion level compared to the other benign processes. The
reason for this is that this is le encryption software which has the same behavior as ransomware.
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Program File suspicion score Quantities File type funnelling Entropy funnelling Sequence suspicion score
Batch image resize 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25
Application update process 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25
AESCrypt 0.72 0.00 2.00 2.00 4.72
AxCrypt 0.68 1.00 2.00 2.00 5.68
WinRAR compress 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
WinRAR decompress 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38
Zip compress 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Zip decompress 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38
Git 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25
Median 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25
Table 2: A list of benign application and their behavior-based indicator values
additionally with the sequence suspicion score.
7.2 Indicator eectiveness
Comparing the indicators and their scores between the benign software and the ransomware we
notice that the quantities and the le type funnelling clearly separate them. Additionally, the
le suspicion level of benign software is lower but it is only useful in the union with the other
indicators due to the classication of the le name, le extension and le class which can be
easily faked.
In contrast the other two behavior-based indicators are less burdened with false positives,
since it is much harder to hide those operations from the monitor, and capture multiple prop-
erties which are signicant for ransomware.
8 Usability
To evaluate the usability of our approach we performed an online survey without any limitations
for the participations. The reason for this is that our approach tries to be usable for everybody.
We had 30 participants between the age of 20 and 46 years with 57,1% being male and
42,9% being female.
The goal was to evaluate the usability of our approach compared to restoring all les le-
by-le with the use of the trash bin of a personal cloud storage and in addition the support of
color guidance for detection ransomware attacks.
The survey was structured as following: Firstly, we collected personal information and
the foreknowledge followed by the preference about single le recovery or sequence recovery
by asking simple multiple choice questions after describing the scenario to the participants.
Thirdly, we asked the participants to decide, which of the given three sequences depicts a
ransomware attack. This was done for three sets of three sequences each with and without
color guidance. For each set of sequences without color guidance the colors were removed
and was presented to the user before presenting the sets with color guidance. To assist the
participants spotting the ransomware attacks, two behavior characteristics were given before
displaying the sets of sequences. Each set was presented alone and the decision was collected
directly afterwards. The sequences were displayed as screenshot similar to gures 7, 8, 9 and
10. Afterwards, the feedback and criticism of the color guidance and the whole approach was
collected with a text eld and we also asked { for participants who preferred single le recovery
over sequence recovery { if they changed their mind about.
50% did not know something about ransomware before taking the survey but two did not
answer this question. Asked if the participants would prefer to recover all les le-by-le or as a
sequence of les { 96,7% preferred the sequence recovery. Reasons for this were the easy usage
and the quicker approach but it was also demanded to be able to select single les. The one
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person preferring single le recovery over sequence recovery changed their mind after learning
about the sequence recovery.
The participants correctly recovered 52% of the ransomware attacks without guidance com-
pared to 73% correct recovered ransomware attacks with guidance. Thus we have an increase
by 21% with the help of the color guidance. This is also conrmed by 73% of the participants
who said that the color guidance helped them spotting the ransomware attacks quicker and
easier due to the clear color choice and the direct comparison. One person was confused by the
guidance and the approach as whole. Two participants were not able to spot the ransomware
attack neither without guidance nor with the guidance and did not perceive the guidance as
simplication.
Without the guidance the ransomware attack must full one of the both given behavior
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characteristics very clearly to be classied as ransomware attack by the participants. If this is
not given or a sequence looks similar, the percentage of the correctly as ransomware classied
sequence by the participants is only half (see gures 11, 12 and 13).
In contrast the sequences with guidance were classied correctly in over 66% of all questions
(see gures 14, 15 and 16).
The foreknowledge does not help the user when it comes to spotting the ransomware attacks.
We assume the reason for this is that many reports about ransomware do explain the basic
behavior but the most readers cannot transfer their knowledge into a concrete process on a
computer.
Conclusively, the recovery interface with the le sequences and the color coding are easily
adopted and well understandable thus oer a very good usability. The color coding reduces
the uncertainty of the user which seem to exist without it. The participants liked the quick
recovery of le sequences making the extra amount of work { in contrast to automatic recovery
approaches { not problematic.
More details of the survey are given in [6].
9 Limitations
Although we extract the false positives by handing over the decision to the educated user guided
by the information gathered by our analysis and classication methods, we can separate the
limitations in the non-technical user responsibilities and the technical ones.
The non-technical user responsibilities are to be creative, adaptive and sceptical to non-
suspicious sequences which can be created with bypassing our technical approaches [18].
Independent from the non-technical user responsibilities, there are some technical limi-
tations, which can be used to evade our detection mechanisms and the according counter-
measures.
9.1 Attacking the le classication score
The le classication score consists of three parts: The le name classication, the le extension
classication, including the le corruption, and the entropy of the le data.
For every part simulating a normal le takes eect and allows the attacker to keep the
suspicion level below the threshold. The simulation of a normal le is simple for the le name
and le extension but more extensive when it comes to the data entropy. This could be done
by adding garbage data to it. This would lead to additional eort, for adding and removing
the garbage data, and would also increase the le size. Hence we may gain additional detection
patterns and encrypted les with the same reduced entropy or additional header informations
about the entropy reduction if done randomly for every le.
All three bypassing methods are possible and would reduce the le suspicion level drastically
but would be detected in the sequence classication score because the attacker has to encrypt
many les on the system { optimally all les on the system { to launch an successful ransomware
attack.
9.2 Attacking the sequence classication score
Attacking the sequence classication score is much more complex then attacking the le classi-
cation score since it is not based on content-based or metadata-based indicators but rather on
behavior-based indicators. The behavior of ransomware is unique and is hardly changed.
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We use four behavior-based detection techniques to classify a sequence of le operations:
operation quantities and size quantities can be circumvented by delaying operations long enough
that the monitor creates a new sequence or by writing additional les. However, delaying
operations are contradictory to the needs of ransomware and increase the risk of being detected
in the meantime. This risk is targeted by our approach by dening a long enough time interval
between sequences. Although some ransomware families keep the le extension from the victims
le, keeping the header informations of the le to bypass the corruption detection is special
and would make the encryption and decryption process more complex. Writing additional les
or increasing the le size by adding garbage data leads to additional eort because it must be
added systematically that it can be removed before decrypting the le. The le type funnelling
can be bypassed by using the same le extension and the same header informations as the
victim le. To bypass the entropy funnelling the attacker must reduce the entropy of the le.
The problems with this were already explained in the last subsection.
All these attacks are possible but are only eective as an union. Implementing only one or
two would lead to a lower suspicion but the sequence could still be easily spotted as ransomware
attack by the user.
9.3 File versioning
File versioning and trash bin implementations in personal cloud storages comprise some advan-
tages in contrast to a classical backup strategy: A cloud storage separates the ransomware host
from the le storage helping to guard the detection mechanism and the les. Additionally, we
have double existence of the data thus a disruption of the synchronization { be it because of
ransomware or by the user { allows us to always recover the les also if it is a selective disrup-
tion. Furthermore, people who locally backup regularly can be a victim of backup encryption
by ransomware, a disk failure or a loss of the backup [23, 22].
Together with these features there are some negative aspects in terms of storage space,
speed and complexity. Nextcloud uses a simple le versioning and trash bin functionality {
by copying the le to a special directory before performing any changes to it { which can use
up to 50% of the user's availably free space but uses clean up methods to reduce the space
used. Furthermore, for every synchronized le modication a constant number of additional
operations have to be performed to create a le version and backup the le accordingly in the
correct storage. This usage of multiple backup storages and le management methods increases
the complexity of storing and synchronizing les of the system [13, 14].
Compared to the gain of le versioning and the trash bin, the eort is reasonably small.
9.4 Local changes
Changes applied on the local system which are then later encrypted by a ransomware attack can
be a problem depending on when the synchronization process takes place: If the synchronization
takes place before the attack no data will be lost. If the synchronization takes place after the
encryption the changes will be lost. The time interval between the modication of the data and
the synchronization is small and so will be the changes. Thus we can assume that the user is
currently working on the data and will immediately notice that something is wrong with the
les. Therefore the user will be able to recover all the data and manual reapply the changes.
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10 Conclusions
In this paper, we dened general problems ghting ransomware with generic properties. This
included the base rate fallacy and the problem of missing signicant generic indicators regarding
a single le for blocking them in real-time.
We also described ransomware classes based on the behavior of the le destruction, the op-
erations sequence, the le type funnelling and the entropy funnelling. Following, we formulated
ransomware indicators and categorised them into three classes: Content-based, metadata-based
and behavior-based ones.
We observed that we are able to separate encrypted from compressed les on the basis of the
standard deviation of the entropy once we split the le in data blocks, allowing us to increase
the validity of the entropy indicator.
Justied through the base rate fallacy of automatic real-time detection and recovery of
ransomware attacks, we propose a delayed detection and recovery based on a personal cloud
storage with le versioning permitting us to remove false positives and increase the usability
by taking the user into responsibility. This approach is supported by the guidance of the
classication of the le operation sequence based on the ransomware indicators.
This method is supported by the idea that we have no need to recover from ransomware
attacks in real-time as long as we do not lose data in the mean-time, we can increase the quality
of the classication and the usability of the recovery for the user.
The usage of a strategy with le versioning opens up the use of behavior-based indicators
to classify the whole sequence le operations according to a ransomware attack. This strategy
reects an improvement regarding the already proposed classication approaches.
Additionally, the implementation of the ransomware detection on the basis of a personal
cloud storage removes the threat of the monitor being attacked and also takes care that there
is always a backup of the les.
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